Page started: June 18, 2025. Page edited: Augustus 27, 2025.
In the coming months I intend to work on this page.
Urban myth
A story or statement that is not true but is often repeated, and believed by many to be true.
dictionary.cambridge.org
Truth is the most valuable thing we have. Let us economize it.
Mark Twain
Windshear is not the cause (nor a contributing factor) of the Martinair crash in Faro. But, in public perception it still is.
About this page
After all these years (decades even) and information on the crash and its causes I never expected this page to be necessary.
After consulting several pages on the crash in June 2025 (also Wikipedia), I noticed that the fact-bending untruth of (unexpected) windshear as cause of the crash still leads a tenacious life.
This poses the threat that generative artificial intelligence, like ChatGPT, will act as an amplifying echo chamber for this disinformation. Especially since a great number of users will not factcheck AI-outcome against primary sources, such as the official investigation report. If primary sources are mentioned at all.
With this page I hope to inform readers better and encourage web-administrators to amend their text.
Intended topics in this page:
Origin of the windshear-myth
– Martin Schröder, day after the crash in press-conference with Dutch Minister of Transport
– deliberate imagery to prevent from looking into underlying causes of the crash, such as corporate and sectoral safety culture?
From article in Dutch paper Reformatorisch Dagblad, 19 Dec. ’98
Original text translated into English.
Article title: ‘Faro’ meets the scenario for a crash
‘Iceberg
Admittedly, with the wisdom of hindsight, it’s always easy to make the right decision [on preventing the crash].
However, the crew certainly did not lack alarming data during the approach to Faro.
The pilots knew much more than, for example, director Martin Schröder, who quickly stated that wind shear had led to the dramatic outcome of the flight.
Surely he should have realized that someone who names the cause 24 hours after such a disaster is always speaking out of turn.
People who have been in aviation for several decades know that a crash is almost always the result of a complex of factors. In this respect, ‘Faro’ fully meets the scenario applicable to dozens of aircraft accidents.
In such a complex, the crew is often just the tip of the iceberg.
In this case the company Martinair is responsible for a significant part of the iceberg that still exists to this day.’
1991 Dutch view: look beyond pilot error for causes of plane crash
“Often the crew is to blame, but there is usually a whole story behind that. If you do nothing about this [the story behind], you haven’t made any progress at all…”
Benno Baksteen [then president of Dutch Airline Pilots Association] on causes of air accidents in the 1991 book De Zwarte Doos – (The Black Box).
1998 public unrest of Martinair pilots on their workload
The unrest in 1998 (6 years after the crash) of Martinair pilots because of their workload, and especially the Martinair’s spokesperson reaction to this (see below), makes scrutiny of Martinair’s management culture in 1992 even more important.
See, translated, article in Dutch newspaper Trouw.
Martinair’s spokesperson:
“… The pilot must always judge for himself whether he is equipped enough to take to the air. There are situations when you [Martinair operations] suddenly need a substitute. A passenger doesn’t care if a pilot is sick or nauseous. The passenger wants to get to his destination.”..
From the official investigation report (1994)
– probable causes and contributing factors
– letter of the NTSB
– page 32, 1 .6.2.3: no airworthiness directive for engine no. 3
– page 76, 1 .15.2: fire and alarm, 1 ½ minute before crash
– page 108, 2.2.3: passivity of captain throughout whole approach
Anglo Portuguese News, dec 21, 1995:
Dutch organisation alleges cover-up of cause of ’92 Faro air crash
Verdict court of The Hague (2020)
– analysis of verdict
– May 2021, Martin Schröder seems not to accept the court’s verdict on errors by his pilots
AvioConsult:
Report (2017) the last 80 seconds of flight MP495
Example from this report:
1.3. All Conclusions of This Analysis – Sectionalized
1.3.1 Application of Procedures
1.3.1.1 The CVR transcript proves that the airplane was not configured in-time for the approach and landing (§ 4.1.4). Landing gear extended, flaps and slats too late, approach speed not attained.
The crew did not follow the prescribed procedures.
1.3.1.2 The required calls for approach safety at altitudes 500 ft and 50 ft were not given by the captain and flight engineer, and not by the pilot-flying, the copilot, either.
In addition, other procedural and safety related calls were not given either.
The cockpit crew did not adhere to the AOM-prescribed crew coördination procedures. (§ 5.6.1 and § 5.12.5).
On evaluating the pilots performance:
What if this flight was a proficiency check, would the pilots have passed?